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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.

]1

Case No. 920475CA

]
])

BARRY J. SNYDER,
Defendant-Appellant

Priority No. 2

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of The
First Judicial District of the State of Utah in and for the County of
Cache, Honorable Robert W. Daines, presiding, dated, June 22, 1992,
finding the defendant guilty of two counts of lewdness involving a
child,

two

Class

A

Misdemeanors.

The

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f) (1953 as
amended).

This appeal is taken by the defendant under Article I,

Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. §77-l-6(g) and
§78-4-11 (1953 as amended), and pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

A.
1.
sufficient

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
The Trial Court failed to state its findings on the record in
detail to enable the Utah Court of Appeals to adequately

review the Trial Court f s decision.

The issue is a question of law, and

the standard of review is a correction of error s t a n d a r d .

(See State v .

Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

The Trial Court failed to grant the Motion to Suppress on the

basis the police failed to advised defendant of his rights as required in
Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U . S . 436 (1966).

The issue is a question of

law, and the standard of review is a correction of e r r o r

standard.

(See State v . Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990).
3.

In the alternative, the Trial Court failed to grant relief for

the defendant's failure to file it's motion to suppress timely.
is a question of law, and the standard
discretion determination.

(See State v .

The issue

of review is an abuse of
Fulton,

742 P.2d

1208 (UT

1987).
4.

In

the

alternative,

defendant

was

denied

the

effective

assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional
r i g h t s in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress which
prejudiced

defendant's

right

to a fair

trial

and

further

failed

to

r e a s s e r t the Motion to Suppress at critical stages of the proceedings.
The issue is a question of law, and the standard of review is

2

ff

de novo"

where the question is whether counsel's performance was deficient in
some demonstrable manner so as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and there is a reasonable probability
t h a t , but for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding
would have been more favorable to the defendant.

State v . Pascual,

804 P . 2d 553 (Utah App. 1991); State v . Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah
1989); Strickland v . Washington, 466 U . S . 668 (1984).

B.
1.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO
HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF MARTY PRESCOTT.
The trial court erred in not granting Defendant's

Pre-trial

Motion to Suppress on the basis of untimely notice of new witnesses for
trial.

The standard of review is a "correction of error"

standard.

(See State v . Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989).
2.
Exclude

The trial court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion to
her

testimony

exclusionary r u l e .
determination.
3.

In

on

the

basis

of

violation

of

the

witness

The standard of review is an abuse of discretion

(See State v . Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981).
the

alternative,

defendant

was

denied

the

effective

assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional
r i g h t s in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress

the

testimony of Marty Prescott which prejudiced defendant right to a fair
trial and further failed to reassert the Motion to Suppress at critical
stages of the proceedings and failed to ensure she was not present
during critical argument of proper jury instructions which set forth the
facts and law critical to the case. The standard of review is

ft

de novo"

where the question is whether counsel's performance was deficient in
some demonstrable manner so as to fall below an objective standard of

3

reasonable professional judgment, and there is a reasonable probability
that, but for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding
would have been more favorable to the defendant.

State v .

Pascual,

804 P.2d 553 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah
1989); Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

C.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
MOVE TO DISMISS ONE COUNT OF LEWDNESS ON THE
BASIS OF THE FAILURE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS TO
IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE IN
FAILING TO REQUEST THE COURT TO GIVE A
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY.

The Standard of Review is "de novo" where the question
whether

counsel's

manner

so

as

to

performance
fall

below

was
an

deficient
objective

in

some

standard

is

demonstrable
of

reasonable

professional judgment; and there is a reasonable probability that, but
for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding would have
been more favorable to the defendant.
(Utah

App.

1991);

State

v.

Carter,

State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553
776

P. 2d

Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

886

(Utah

1989);

See also State v .

Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) as to cautionary instruction.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE
TESTIMONY OF BRIAN J. ORME.

The Standard of Review is an abuse of discretion determination.
(See State v . Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981).

E.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL
ALLOWING BRIAN J. ORME TO BE PRESENT DURING
4

TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF THE WITNESS EXCLUSORY
RULE.
The Standard of Review is "de novo" where the question is
whether
manner

counsel's
so

as

to

performance
fall

below

was
an

deficient
objective

in

some

standard

demonstrable
of

reasonable

professional judgment; and there is a reasonable probability that, but
for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding would have
been more favorable to the defendant.
(Utah

App.

1991);

State

v.

Carter,

State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553
776

P. 2d

886

(Utah

1989);

Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

F.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1,
RELATING TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF
LEWDNESS; PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3,
RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF TRESPASS AND
VOYEURISM AND TRESPASSORY VOYUERISM; PART OF
PROFFERED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 RELATING TO
DEFINITION OF EXPOSING; AND PROFFERED JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 DEFINING THE WORDS AFFRONT AND
ALARM.

The Standard of Review is discretionary and in the interest of
justice review.

(See State v . Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977); Rule 19,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Issue No. A (1-4):
a.

Amendment V of the United States Constitution reads as

follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

5

or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or p r o p e r t y , without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public u s e , without just
compensation.
b.

Article I,

Section

12 of the Utah

Constitution

reads

as

follows:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused p e r s o n ,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
c.

Amendment VI of the United States Constitution reads

as

follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.
d.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(b) (c) and

(d)

reads as follows:
(a)
Any defense, objection or r e q u e s t , including request for
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
6

determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised
prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at
least five days prior to the trial: . . .
(2)

motions concerning the admissibility of evidence;

(3)

requests for discovery where allowed. . .

(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial
unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be
deferred for later determination.
Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record.
(d)
Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof,
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
Issue No. B (1-3)
a.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16(a) and (g) reads

as follows:
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of
which he has knowledge: . . .
(5)
any other item of evidence which the court determines on
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. . .
(g)
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a p a r t y has failed to
comply with this rule, the court may order such p a r t y to permit
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
p a r t y from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
b.

Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 (1953 as amended) reads as follows:

In an action of divorce, criminal conversation,
seduction,
abortion, rape or assault with intent to commit r a p e , the court
may, in its discretion, exclude all persons who are not directly
interested therein, except j u r o r s , witnesses and officers of the

7

court; and in any cause the court may, in its discretion, during
the examination of a witness exclude any and all other witnesses
in the cause.
c.

The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears

u n d e r A.
d.

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution appears u n d e r

A.
e.

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure,

Rule

12(b)

and

(d)

appears u n d e r A.
f.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30 reads as follows:

(a) Any e r r o r , defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect the substantial rights of a p a r t y shall be disregarded.
Issue No. C:
a.

The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears

u n d e r A.
b.

Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution appears u n d e r

c.

Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution reads in

A.

p a r t as follows:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
p r o p e r t y , without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
d.

Article I, Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah Constitution reads as

follows:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or p r o p e r t y , without
due process of law.
Issue No. D:
a.

The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears

u n d e r A.
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b.

Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 appears under B.

Issue No. E:
a.

The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears

u n d e r A.
b.

Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution appears u n d e r

c.

Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 appears under B.

A.

Issue No. F:
a.

Utah

Rules of

Criminal Procedure,

Rule

19(c)

reads

as

follows:
No p a r t y may assign as error any portion of the charge or
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a p a r t y ' s failure to
object, e r r o r may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a
manifest injustice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

An

Information

was

filed

on

March

26,

1992,

charging

the

defendant with two counts of Lewdness Involving a Child, both Class A
Misdemeanors, and summons was served on the defendant on March 31,
992.

(R. 57-60).

By letter to the court, Raymond N. Malouf, entered

his appearance on behalf of the defendant, requested the court accept
the defendant's plea of "not guilty" and that the matter be set
trial.

(R. 55).

The matter was set for trial, p u r s u a n t to notice of the

court, for May 21, 1992.

(R. 54).

On May 15, 1992,

through his counsel of record, filed a Motion to S u p p r e s s .
The

for

State objected

to the Motion.

9

defendant,
(R. 44-47).

The mailing certificate

on

the

Objection is dated May 18, 1992; no date stamp is on the Objection in
the court's file,

(R. 42-43).

Suppress on May 19.

A hearing was held on the Motion to

(R. 20; T 2 ) .

The court found it would be a

useless act to hold a hearing on the Motion to Suppress because the
defendant was given his rights and that the Motion was not timely.
(R. 20; T. 27).

The defendant was tried by a jury on May 21, 1992,

and count guilty and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 365
days in jail and two fines of $740.
suspended if defendant

The jail time and fines

were

serve 20 days in jail, complete 40 hours of

community service, complete outpatient counseling with ISAT along with
other minor terms and conditions.

(R. 6 ) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 17, 1992, shortly after school had dismissed for

the

d a y , three minor children were walking past the Barry Snyder's home
in River Heights, Utah, and stopped in front of his house.
114).

( T . 76,

The defendant had previously been having trouble with school

children destroying property or playing practical jokes on him, so he
stood up to watch the children through a window when his dog started
to b a r k .

( T . 181, 185).

He had just gotten out of the shower, had

been sitting on the couch, fondling himself, and was naked at the time.
( T . 181, 213)
When it appeared

to the defendant

the minor girls were

not

leaving his p r o p e r t y , he went into the next room and pulled on a pair
of light colored s h o r t s , and opened the front door and screen door and
yelled at the girls to get away from his p r o p e r t y .

10

( T . 182-185).

Two of the minor girls testified at trial concerning the incident.
The older girl,

Nicolee,

age nine,

testified

she saw a naked

man

standing halfway in and halfway out of the doorway with his penis
down. ( T . 76, 77, 79, 92).
same guy she saw.

She indicated the defendant looked like the

( T . 79).

The younger girl, Amber, age seven,

stated she saw a naked person touching his penis,
sticking up a little in the air.

( T . 115-117).

the individual she saw in the doorway.
counsel

never

made

a

Motion

to

penis

She could not identify

( T . 119).

Dismiss

with his

and

The

never

defendants
requested

a

cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness testimony.
On March 18, 1992, two sheriff deputies came to the defendant's
home in River Heights, Utah, and took him to the Child and Family
Support Center at 14 North and about Fifth West in Logan.
142).

( T . 140-

The defendant was not advised he was free to go at any time,

and because of the insistence of the deputies, he did not believe he
could leave.

( T . 239, 240).

officer at the time.

Defendant was a Category One police

( T . 238),

When the deputies and the defendant arrived, the investigating
officer stated:
LN:

Um, typically in these situations I have to read people
r i g h t s . I think you know what your rights a r e , probably.

BS:

Oh, yea.

LN:

And understand them.

BS:

Yea.

their

(R. 45)

The interview with the defendant was then videotaped.
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( T . 144).

The

defendant

was

never

read

his

Miranda

rights.

In

the

interview he informed the police officers he had been in the shower
masturbating

and

continued

shower.

( T . 145, 146).

walk

from

by

his

to masturbate after

he got out

of

the

He further stated he watched the little kids

front

window;

and,

as

he

watched

them,

"he

visualized other women or things from movies, fantasies that he had
seen previous to that time."
cross-examination
interrogation.
how far it

was

from

(T.

147).

statements

Almost all of
he

made

in

defendants

the

custodial

For example, statements to the effect that he wondered

(masturbation)

can go and

"What I need to do is

something that can curb that masturbation u r g e ,
problem, that's the problem.

( T , 257).

that's the

find

biggest

Similar prejudicial statements

taken thereafter were used against the defendant at trial.

( T . 248-

262).
The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all statements taken in
the interview and to suppress testimony of all witnesses not previously
identified by the State.
proffers of testimony.

(R. 44-47).
( T . 27).

The court reviewed the Motion on

It appears the court ruled against the

defendant on the Motions, although the record is not clear.

(T.

27).

The court did rule that the motions were untimely in that they had not
been filed more than five days prior to trial.
At the first
requested
( T . 46).

of the trial,

( T . 28).

the defendant

and

the

the exclusion of witnesses during the court
During argument on jury instructions,

State

proceedings.

Marty Prescott,

witness for the State, was present in the courtroom ( T . 292).
objection, the court allowed her to testify.

both

( T . 292-293).

a

Over

Brian Orme,

a proposed rebuttal witness of the defendants, was present during some
12

of the afternoon testimony.
testify.

( T . 273)

The court did not allow him to

( T . 273).

Counsel

for

defendant

requested

specific

instructions

and

definitions relating to the elements of the crime of which defendant was
accused.

The court refused to give the instructions.

( T . 275-291).

Following the jury verdict, the defendant, because of his indigent
s t a t u s , requested and was appointed a public defender to assist him in
p u r s u i n g his rights on appeal.

(R.

12).

A jury found the defendant guilty of Lewdness involving a child,
two counts, and the defendant was sentenced to serve 20 days in jail,
to perform 40 hours of community service, to complete an outpatient
counseling with ISAT, and to pay costs of $350 through Adult Probation
and Parole.

(R. 6 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A defendant is entitled to certain constitutional guarantees and
statutory procedural guarantees which afford that he will receive a fair
and impartial trial with all the safeguards and presumptions given to
him.
Mr. Snyder was not afford his constitutional guarantees.
the court's involvement in the matter,

Mr.

Prior to

Snyder was taken

into

custodial interrogation and not read his rights guaranteed to him by the
United States Constitution and the State Constitution.

In particular, he

was not told he had the right to remain silent, or that he had the right
to counsel.

Incriminating information, used against him in impeachment

and in direct testimony at trial, was taken from him at that time by a
means of a videotape.
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Mr. Snyder was initially led to believe this information would not
be used against him at trial.

Shortly before the trial date, he learned

the t r a n s c r i p t of the proceeding was going to be used at trial and that
certain other impeachment witnesses were going to be called.
attorney filed a Motion to S u p p r e s s .

His

The Motion was not filed prior to

five days before trial.
The record is not clear whether the trial court ever reached the
merits of the Motion to Suppress as to the information on the videotape.
The court did rule the Motion to Suppress was untimely and did not
include a request to suppress the witnesses.
Mr. Snyder on appeal argues that ruling was not correct.
of all, the findings are not clear, and the record so insufficient
the Court on Appeal should remand the case.
officers

First
that

Secondly, the police

failed to adequately inform Mr. Snyder of his

constitutional

r i g h t s as required in the United States Supreme Court case of Miranda
v . United States.
court

in

its

Thirdly, that even though the filing was late, the

discretion,

in

order

to

protect

those

very

basic

constitutional rights of the defendant, should have fully reviewed the
matter and granted the Motion.

Finally, in the alternative, counsel for

defendant should have timely filed the necessary Motions and the failure
of counsel to do so r e n d e r s defendant with ineffective counsel which
impacted upon the fundamental fairness and due process r i g h t s of the
defendant to have a fair trial.
The witness defendant sought to have suppressed from testifying
was

Marty Prsecott.

Notice of Mrs. Prescott f s testimony was not given

to counsel for defendant until shortly before trial.

The court should

have excluded

or ordered

her testimony,

continued
14

the trial,

some

safeguards to protect the defendant from the s u r p r i s e .

The court did

nothing, and Mrs. Prescott was allowed to testified to the substantial
harm to defendant.

Mrs. Prescott was also present in the courtroom

when jury instructions were argued and witness testimony

discussed.

The court had previously excluded all witnesses under the exclusionary
rule.
for

Despite t h i s , she was allowed to testify.
the

defendant

testimony.
discretion
witness.

was also present

during

Brian Orme, a witness
some of

He was not allowed to testify.
in allowing the

State f s

witness

the

afternoon

The court abused
and

not

the

its

defendant's

In the alternative, the counsel for the defendant should have

more timely filed a Motion to Suppress Mrs. Prescott's testimony,
filed a motion to continue the trial date.

or

F u r t h e r , he failed to object to

her testimony during trial and failed to ensure she was not present
during the critical stages in the proceeding.
Counsel for the defendant was also ineffective in that he failed to
ensure

that

Brian Orme was not present

in the

courtroom

during

testimony.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that in cases involving
eyewitness testimony, a cautionary instruction is required to safeguard
against the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.

Counsel for defendant

never requested such an instruction and none was given.

This was

extremely prejudicial to the defendant in that the jury was not informed
as to the proper weight to give to the eyewitnesses.
Finally,

the

court

did

not

adequately

explain

the

necessary

elements of the crime to which the defendant was charged such that the
jury could not effectively evaluate his guilt or innocence on the matter.
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ARGUMENT

A.

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

BY

NOT

GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
1.

The Trial Court failed to state its findings on the record in

sufficient detail to enable the Court of Appeal to adequately review the
Trial Court f s decision.
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v . Marshall, 791
P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990) has stated that with respect to motions to
s u p p r e s s , the trial court is to state its findings on the record.
findings

must

be

sufficiently

detailed

in

order

to

opportunity to adequately review the decision below."

"Those

allow

us

Id. at 882.

The opinion of the trial court on this matter is not clear.
point

the

court

indicates

that

the

defendant

was

the

given

At one

his

p u r s u a n t to Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U . S . 436 (1966), y e t ,

rights

thereafter,

appears to base his ruling on the untimeliness of defendant's Motion.
The failure of the trial court to identify the basis of denial of the
Motion to Suppress should require this court to remand the case to the
lower court to re-examine the issue of the lack of the Miranda warning
and for a new trial.
2.

The Trial Court failed to grant the Motion to Suppress on the

basis the police failed to advise defendant of his rights as required in
Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U . S . 436 (1966).
Assuming

the

lower

court

ruled

that

the

defendant

was

not

entitled to the Miranda warning because of his category as a police
officer at the time of the custodial interrogation, the ruling is contrary
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to United States and Utah case law and should be reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial.
The United State Supreme Court explicitly stated in the Miranda
case

that

any

interrogation
guaranteed

person

who

has

the

right

under

the

V and

has
to

been
be

VI

brought

read

his

Amendment

in

for

custodial

constitutional
of

the

rights

United

State

Constitution, i . e . their right to silence and their right to counsel.
at 444.

Id.

As stated by the Court:

The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate
warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant
was aware of his rights without a warning being given.
Assessment of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning
is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of
the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its p r e s s u r e s and to
insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the
privilege at that point in time.
Id. at 468-469.
The

Court,

thereafter,

went

on

to

hold

in

regard

to

the

defendant's right to counsel:
Accordingly, we hold that an individual held for interrogation
must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a
lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation
u n d e r the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today.
As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that
anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this
warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.
No amount
of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of
this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a
warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was
aware of this r i g h t .
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Id. at 472 (emphasis a d d e d ) .
T h u s , the Miranda case leaves no doubt that the warning should
and must be given in order to protect the defendant involved.
Other cases have likewise specifically indicated that the warning
is appropriate even when a police officer is a defendant.

Rothschild v .

State, 388 F. S u p p . 1346 (1974); Peden v . United States, 512 F.2d 1099
(Ct.Claims 1975); Widomski v . Chief, 397 A.2d 222 (MD 1979).
The Utah courts have likewise adopted and cited with approval
the United States Supreme Court case of Miranda.

See, for example,

State v . Mincy, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 1992).
Barry Snyder was taken from his home by two police officers and
driven from River Heights to the other end of Logan, Utah.

The police

officers acknowledged to him that he was in a situation where a reading
of his r i g h t s was r e q u i r e d , i . e . "typically in these situations I have to
read people their r i g h t s . "

(R. 45).

However, the police thereafter did

not read Mr. Snyder his rights in contradiction of the clear language of
Miranda that the only way to assure and guarantee those rights to a
defendant in this situation to actually read to him his full and complete
rights.

This was not done.

The failure to exclude the material obtained in the taped interview
was extremely prejudicial to the defendant.

Mr. Snyder, because of

the p r e s s u r e of the situation and his personal feelings of remorse over
a habit that may be out-of-control, revealed to the police officers his
problem with masturbation, sexual fantasies and that he did not know
where the problem may lead.

Was Mr. Snyder thereafter

convicted

because he was actually naked in front of two very young girls, or did
the jury convict him, not because he was guilty beyond a reasonable
18

doubt, but because they felt he had a problem that he needed some
professional help in solving.

A strong possibility that Mr. Snyder was

convicted because of his sexual fantasies,

and not from any act of

actual lewdness on his p a r t .
The testimony of Marty Prescott is likewise tainted.
put

in a situation when he was obligated

Having been

to reveal certain

sexual

problems to his fellow officers, s h e , as a dispatcher for his employer,
may have asked him about the revelation.
other officers

never occurred,

Had the interview with the

the conversation with Marty

probably may have also never occurred,

Prescott

(cite fruit of poisonous tree)

The damming sexual problem he may have would have been properly
kept from the j u r y ; and Mr. Snyder, based on the weak evidence of
the two little girls, would have not been convicted.
"Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty."
458.

Miranda, at

Mr. Snyder's basic rights have been taken away in this matter,

and this court should dismiss the counts against him and grant him the
right to a fair trial.
3.

In the alternative, the Trial Court failed to grant relief for

the defendant's failure to file his motion to suppress timely.
The lower court ruled that Mr. Snyder's Motion to Suppress was
untimely in that it was not filed within the five day time requirement
set forth in Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Given the

strong basic constitutional issues involved, defendant submits the court
abused its discretion in failing to allow him those guarantees set forth
in the V and VI Amendments to the United States Constitution
found in Article I,

Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
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and

Further,

reasonable
received

excuse
the

existed

written

in

that

transcript,

had

defendant's
been

counsel

led

had

to believe

barely

that

the

information was not going to be used, and immediately filed the Motion
upon learning the information was intended on being used against the
defendant.
Rule 12(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the lower
court to grant

relief from the time requirement.

The lower

court

abused its discretion by not allowing the defendant to fully present his
Motion and by not granting the same.
4.

In

the

alternative,

defendant

was

denied

the

effective

assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional
r i g h t s in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress which
prejudiced

defendant's

right

to a fair

trial

and

further

failed

to

r e a s s e r t the Motion to Suppress at critical stages of the proceedings.
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently, again, set forth
elements a defendant

must establish in order

ineffective trial counsel.

to assert

the

a claim of

In State v . Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48

(Utah App. 1992), this court stated:
To successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show that (1) his counsel's performance was
objectively deficient, and (2) there exists a reasonable probability
t h a t , absent the deficient conduct, the verdict would have been
more favorable to defendant.
Id. at 52.
As in this case, the attorney in Cummins failed to timely file the
statutory require notice of intention to offer the testimony of a mental
health e x p e r t .

The court found that such a failure established that the

counsel's performance was deficient.
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The attorney in this case likewise

missed a deadline in filing Mr. Snyder's Motion to Suppress which the
lower court specifically found as "untimely".

Counsel's performance was

deficient.

See also, State v . Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 (Utah App. 1991);

State

Carter,

v.

Washington,

776

466 U . S .

P. 2d

886

(Utah

668 (1984).

1989);

and

Accordingly,

Strickland

the defendant

v.
was

effectively denied his constitutional right to counsel.
F u r t h e r , a s t r o n g , reasonable probability exists that absent the
failure of Mr. Snyder's attorney to effective prevent the introduction of
the evidence at trial, Mr.
verdict.

Snyder would have received a

favorable

Absent the information given to the police, the jury would

have been left with the conflicting stories of the young girls.
defendant would not have taken the stand.

The

The conflict would have

been more pronouced, and "a better chance for acquittal".

Id. at 52.

To

upon

be

denied

the

Motion,

"may

well

have

impacted

fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged.'"

'the

Id. quoting from

State v . Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Given the failure of his counsel and the strong probability of a
different outcome, a reversal and remand should be ordered.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO

HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF MARTY PRESCOTT.
1.

The Trial Court Erred in not granting Defendants

Pre-trial

Motion to Suppress on the basis of untimely notice of new witnesses for
trial.
The

defendant

was

not

informed

of

the

names

of

additional

witnesses and the fact the information taken from him during a custodial
interrogation with two police officers was going to be used against him
until a week before trial.

At that time his attorney filed a Motion to
21

Suppress the information in the interview, and orally at the hearing two
days before trial, also moved that the new witnesses be excluded.

The

court ruled both Motions were untimely made.
The prosecutor,
inform

the

defendant

introduce at trial.

under this action,

had a continuing duty

to

of

witnesses

to

information

and

he

intended

Pursuant to Rule 16(a)(5), the prosecutor

shall

disclose to the defendant "any other item of evidence which the court
determines

on

good

for

shown
the

should

defendant

be

adequately

to

the

prepare

his

in

defense."

Failure to do so could effect the substantial r i g h t s of the
thus warranting a reversal.

to

made available

defendant

defendant

order

cause

See Rule 30, Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the prosecutor is u n d e r a
continuing

duty

to

inform

the

defendant

of

new

witnesses

information in order to make the trial one of fairness,

a quest

t r u t h , and "not simply a contest between the parties to win."
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987) quoting from State v .
707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).

and
for

State v .
Carter,

The failure of the prosecutor to make a

timely disclosure of evidence "might so mislead defendant as to cause
prejudicial e r r o r . "

Id.

In this case the prosecutor violated his duties u n d e r Rule 16 in
failing to provide the defendant with the needed t r a n s c r i p t ,

leading

defendant to believe the information would not be used at trial,

and

failing to adequately inform defendant of proposed witnesses.
The failure of the prosecutor to untimely provide this information
was brought to the court's attention in the written Motion to Suppress
filed on May 15, 1992, and at the oral argument on the Motion on May
22

19, 1992.

This was done pursuant to Rule 16(g) which provides as

follows:
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a p a r t y has failed to
comply with this rule, the court may order such p a r t y to permit
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
p a r t y from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
The trial court simply denied the d e f e n d a n t s motions and did not
grant

any relief

to the defendant.

Had the information

not

been

introduced at trial a reasonable likelihood exists that the outcome of
Snyder's trial would have resulted in a dismissal.
The court in State v . Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) was faced
with a similar challenge by the defendant that the prosecutor did not
disclose information to him, including statements and witnesses names
and a d d r e s s e s , until shortly before trial.

In reversing the conviction,

the Utah Supreme Court found there was a "reasonable likelihood" that
in the absence of such tainted information,
would have been reached for defendant.

a more favorable

result

Id. at 923.

Absent the incriminating statements of the defendant

and

the

testimony of Marty Prescott, the defendant would have had only the
conflicting testimony of two girls.

F u r t h e r , additional witnesses may

have been called by the defendant

had he had an opportunity

to

p r e p a r e for the trial with a reasonable notice of the use of the material
and the calling of additional witnesses.
have been substantially different.

His pretrial strategy

could

Additional matters of impeachment of

the witnesses may have been discovered and used to discredit

the

testimony

was

had

it

been

admitted.
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Because

the

information

fundamental to, the State's case in chief, and because of the fundamental
unfairness

to the defendant and the reasonable likelihood of a more

favorable

verdict

absence

the

tardiness

of

production

of

the

information, Mr. Snyder's conviction requires a r e v e r s a l .
2.

The Trial Court Erred in not granting Defendant's Motion to

Exclude Marty Prescott f s testimony on the basis of violation of

the

witness exclusionary rule.
The court,
excluded

upon motion of both parties at the first

all witnesses

from

the

courtroom

during

the

of

trial,

proceedings.

Marty Prescott was thereafter present in the courtroom during argument
over jury instructions.
prior

testimony

of

During the arguments, references were made to

other

witnesses.

The

purpose

of

presenting

untainted witnesses to the jury was thereafter impaired because of the
newly acquired knowledge of Marty Prescott.

Despite her knowledge,

and despite the court's previous ruling that all witnesses be excluded
from

the

proceedings,

the

court

defendant, allowed her to testify.

thereafter,

over

objection

of

the

The court abused its discretion and

the conviction should be r e v e r s e d .
3.

In

the

alternative,

defendant

was

denied

the

effective

assistance of counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional
r i g h t s in that counsel failed to timely file a Motion to Suppress
testimony of Marty Prescott which prejudiced defendant f sf
fair trial and further

failed

to reassert

the

right to a

the Motion to Suppress

at

critical stages of the proceedings and failed to ensure she was not
p r e s e n t during critical argument of proper jury instructions which set
forth the facts and law critical to the case.
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Defense counsel never formally filed a Motion to Suppress
testimony of Marty Prescott.

the

The court found at oral argument on the

Motion to Suppress that the Motion was not broad enough to encompass
a Motion as to the newly proposed witnesses.
not renew his objection

The defense counsel did

to the witness or the introduction

evidence in the tape at the time of trial.

of

the

F u r t h e r , defense counsel did

not request a continuance or make any other request to lessen
effect of the testimony and impeachment information.

the

See Rule 16(g),

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Utah case law indicates that a defendant may waive his right to
claim e r r o r as to the newly produced evidence if he does not request a
continuance at the time the evidence is produced.

State v . Larsen, 775

P.2d 415 (Utah 1989); State v .

793 P.2d 944 (Utah

App. 1990).

Christoff erson,

Mr. Snyder's counsel did not make the r e q u e s t .

Without

requesting the continuance and allowing time for the defense to meet
the information at the time of trial, Mr. Snyder's right to
counsel was violated.
1992).

effective

State v . Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. 48 (Utah App.

A substantial likelihood exists the result would have

different.
C.

been

Accordingly, the conviction should be r e v e r s e d .
THE

DEFENDANT

WAS

DENIED

THE

EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE TO
DISMISS ONE COUNT OF LEWDNESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FAILURE
OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST THE COURT TO GIVE A
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY.
At the trial on the matter, one of the eyewitnesses to the incident
could not identify the defendant.

While the other eyewitness believed
25

the defendant to be the man she saw, her testimony of the position of
the penis conflicted with her sister's*
counsel did not r e q u e s t ,

Despite the conflicts,

and the court did not give, a

defense

cautionary

eyewitness identification instruction.
The dissent in State v . Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 62-66 (Utah 1982)
first strongly urged the Utah Supreme Court to recognize the growing
volume of articles

which established

identification and mistaken testimony.

the

unreliability

of

eyewitness

Justice Stewart, in writing the

dissent stated:
The inherent dangers of good faith e r r o r in eyewitness
identification are widely recognized. "The vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification."
Id. at 62, quoting from United States v . Wade, 388 U . S . 218 (1967).
The dissent went on further to state that even when counsel for
the defense does not request an effective

instruction on

eyewitness

testimony, in some courts they have held that the trial judge should
give it in order to safely protect the accused.

Id. at 64, and cases

cited therein.
The dissent of Justice Stewart in State v . Malmrose was adopted
by the majority in the Utah Supreme Court case of State v . Long, 721
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

In that case the Court thoroughly reviewed the

problems with eyewitnesses and the empirical studies documenting the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony.

As the court

stated:

"The

studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion that human perception is
inexact and that human memory is both limited and fallible."
488.
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Id. at

Although the research and evidence demonstrates the problems
with eyewitness accounts, juries tend to give them great weight.
at 490-491.

Id.

As the Court stated:

Although research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses
inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors a r e , for the most
p a r t , unaware of these problems. People simply do not accurately
understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have
on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness.
Id.
Given the totality of the problem, the Utah Supreme Court held
that trial courts are to give a cautionary jury instruction
eyewitness identification is a central issue in the case.

whenever

Id. at 492.

So

so ruling, the Court stated:
Given the great weight jurors are likely to give eyewitness
testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived flaws in it, to
convict a defendant on such evidence without advising the jury of
the factors that should be considered in evaluating it could well
deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution.
Id.
Mr.
process

Snyder's
of

law

rights to a fair and impartial hearing and

under

the

federal

and

state

constitutions

due
were

jeopardized by the failure of his counsel to request the court to give
the cautionary instruction.

Obvious conflicts existed in the evidence.

Without the appropriate instruction,
minimized
justified.

those

conflicts

and

the jury possibility could

afforded

much

greater

weight

with

than

Counsels failure to request the instruction warrants

court in finding his performance was objectively deficient.
along

have

the

other

previously

likelihood that the jurors afforded

mentioned

problems,

this

Further,
the

strong

to much weight to the eyewitness
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testimony

(given the empirical studies listed in

State

v.

Long),

a

reasonable probability. exists that the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant.

Defendants conviction should be r e v e r s e d ,

and the case remanded.
D.

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

IN

NOT

ALLOWING

THE

TESTIMONY OF BRIAN J. ORME.
Brian J . Orme was a rebuttal witness of Barry Snyder to combat
the testimony of the minor girls that Mr. Snyder appeared to be naked
at the time they allegedly saw him.
previously

in

his

yellow

shorts

Brian had observed the defendant
and

would

have

testified

appeared to him that Barry appeared naked in those s h o r t s .

that

it

He was

not allowed to testify because he was present during the testimony of
another witness in violation of the exclusionary rule.
As indicated previously, the exclusionary rule is a discretionary
rule with the judge.

Utah Code Ann. §78-7-4 (1953 as amended).

The

court ordered the exclusion of witnesses at the request of both p a r t i e s .
However, the court relaxed his order and allowed a State's witness to
testify

even

though

information.
testimony.

The

court

had

witness

thereafter

exposed
refused

to
the

previous
defense

witness
the

same

to

The court abused its discretion in allowing the
testify

Snyder's witness to testify.
1981).

been

The failure prevented the defense from effectively rebutting

the case in chief.
State's

she

and

by

thereafter

State v .

refusing

Carlsen,

to allow Mr

635 P.2d

72

(Utah

This court should reverse the conviction.
E.

IN

THE ALTERNATIVE,

THE

DEFENDANT

WAS DENIED

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL ALLOWING BRIAN
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J . ORME TO BE PRESENT DURING TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF THE
WITNESS EXCLUSORY RULE.
Counsel for defendant was aware of the order of Judge Daines to
exclude all witnesses from the courtroom.
also aware of the necessary

rebuttal

Counsel for defendant was

testimony

of

Brian

J.

Orme.

However, counsel did not inform Mr. Orme of the rule, or have the
court request him to leave during the testimony of o t h e r s .
counsel's performance

meets the standards of ineffective

Again,

counsel

set

forth in State v . Cummins, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah App. 1992),
and also in the United States Supreme Court case of Strickland

v.

Washington, 466 U . S . 668 (1984), and the defendant's conviction should
be r e v e r s e d .
F.

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

IN

FAILING

TO

GIVE

DEFENDANTS PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1, RELATING TO
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF LEWDNESS;

PROFFERED

JURY

INSTRUCTION NO. 3, RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF TRESPASS
AND VOYEURISM
PROFFERED

AND

TRESPASSORY

INSTRUCTION

NO.

6

VOYUERISM;

RELATING

TO

PART

DEFINITION

EXPOSING; AND PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

OF
OF

7 DEFINING

THE WORDS AFFRONT AND ALARM.
The Utah State legislature set forth the statutory definition of the
crime of lewdness.
voyeurism,

was

As part of that definition, the term "trespassory

included.

The

court

did

not

include

the

term

"trespassory voyeurism" in the instruction on the elements of the crime
or

a

separate

voyeurism".
the

elements

instruction

as

to

what

constitutes

"trespassory

The definition would have aided the jury in determining
of

the

crime

of

lewdness.
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Without

the

additional

information, the jury may have not correctly understood the necessary
elements of the crime.
The definition of exposing was likewise not given and the words
"affront" and "alarm" were not defined.

These e r r o r s likewise confused

the j u r y on the proper standard and definition necessary to convict the
defendant.

Because of the probability that with the definitions,

the

j u r y ' s outcome would have been affected, the case should be remanded
and the proper instructions given.

State v . Bell, 563 P.2d 186.

CONCLUSION

The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution give the
citizens of Utah fundamental r i g h t s .
to

be

browbeaten,

pushed

into

contradictions, and denied counsel.
443 (1966).

Defendants

are

assistance

proceedings.

of

a

counsel,

corner,

entrapped

into

fatal

Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U . S . 436,

to be

including the protection against
effective

No longer are defendants allowed

guaranteed

certain

self-incrimination,
through

safeguards,

and the right

critical

stages

in

to
the

Along with these fundamental rights come the right to

due process of law and fairness and justice.
Defendant,
proceedings

Barry

expecting

Snyder,

was

brought

certain fundamental

to

right.

denied the right to be informed of those r i g h t s .
right to counsel initially.
effective

assistance

of

this

adversary

He was

initially

He was denied the

Later as he approached trial, he was denied
counsel

through

the

Motion

stage

of

proceeding to the giving of jury instructions at the time of

the
trial.

Witnesses which could have assisted his defense were denied to him
while witnesses from the State were given access to the court's system.
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The jury was not informed as to certain elements of the crime with
which he was charged; and, more importantly, were not instructed as
to the proper weight to give his accusers.
In view of the many e r r o r s ,

it is respectfully

submitted

and

requested that the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the decision of
the trial court and discharge the defendant.

At the very least this

court should allow the defendant to have a trial with the benefit of
effective

counsel

and

the

trial

court

using

correct

and

proper

procedures given to all defendants.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^

day of October, 1992.

PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY

laxk/v. Malmberg
JaxyP.
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jan P. Malmberg, certify that on the
1992,

I served

four

copies of the

attached

J)Cf

day of October,

appellants

brief

upon

Attorney Jeff R. Burbank, Deputy Cache County Attorney, 110 North
100 West, Logan, UT 84321, by hand-delivering the same to him at the
afore-mentioned a d d r e s s .
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ADDENDUM

NOV 61992

Court
,oi Appeals

FIRST CIRCUIT COURT - LOGAN
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

STATE OF UTAH
VS
SNYDER, BARRY J
257 W 600 N
LOGAN

UT

84321

CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:

921000169
05/09/63
92-203COUNT: 3365
06/22/92

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-9-702.5 LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
740.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 365 DA
Susp: 345 DA

ACS:

4 0 HR

Charge: 76-9-702.5 LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
740.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 365 DA
Susp: 345 DA

ACS

40 HR

PROBATION AGENCIES:
Agency Name: ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
Agency Address: 9 5 WEST 100 SOUTH
Agency Address: #240
City/State/Zip: LOGAN
UT 84321
Phone: (801) 752-1151
PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS?
DEF WILL ABIDE BY ALL TERMS & CONDITIONS SET BY AP&P
SERVE 20 DAYS JAIL - AP&P PROBATION FOR 1 YEAR UPON COMPLETION
THE COURT WILL CONSIDER SUSPENSION OF BALANCE OFJAIL COMPLETE 4 0 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE- COMPLETE OUTPATIENT COUNSEL
ING WITH ISAT & PAY COSTS OF $350 THRU AP&P - NO CONTACT WITH
PERSONS UNDER 18 YRS UNLESS WITH ADULTS - STAY FOR 3 0 DAYS
CALENDAR:
SENTENCING
REVIEW HEARING

06/22/92 11:00 AM in rm 1 with DAINES, ROBERT W.
07/22/92 06:00 PM in rm 1 with HARRIS, BURTON H,

L

SNYDER, BARRY J

CASE NO: 921000169

PAGE 2

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor not present
ATD: MALMBERG, JAN
TAPE: 92-203
COUNT: 3365
Judge: DAINES, ROBERT W.
REV
scheduled for 07/22/92 at 0600 P in room 1 with BHH

JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURTia.v^a,
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
INSTRUCTION NO.

'

Before you convict the Defendant of the crime of lewdness
involving a child, you must find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, al1 of the following elements of that crime:
1.

That the Defendant exposed his genitals or private parts,

masturbated, engaged in trespassory voyeurism, or performed any
other act of gross lewdness.
2.

That if the Defendant did any of the things described in

number 1 above, that the act was under circumstances which he
should know would likely cause affront or alarm to someone else.
3.

That

if any- thing described

in number

1 above was

performed in circumstances where the Defendant should know it would
likely cause affront or alarm (as described in number 2 above) that
the thing done was done in the presence of another who was under 14
years of age.
4.

That the event occurred in Cache County, State of Utah,

on March 17, 1992.
If you believe the evidence fails to establish anyone or more
of the foregoing

essential elements of the offense, beyond a

reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the Defendant "Not
Guilty".

On the other hand, if the evidence establishes each and

every one of the foregoing essential elements, beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you should find the Defendant "Guilty".
J

i

• !

U.C.A. S e c t i o n 7 6 - 9 - 7 0 2 . 5

i

!

^ /
c:snyji.rtd

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
INSTRUCTION NO.
You are

instructed

that the phrase

"in the presence of

another" refers to the state or fact of being

in the space

immediately surrounding a person.
You are further instructed that the word "immediately" means
with no intervening space or object; and the word "immediate" means
without an intervening interval.

Webster's

Encyclopedic

Dictionary

791, 484

(1990),

c:snyji6.rtd

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
INSTRUCTION NO.

§ 'P

You are instructed that the word "trespass" means to enter
someone's property unlawfully.
You are

instructed

that the word

"voyeurism"

is conduct

wherein one finds sexual pleasure in looking at r>ex acts, genital
organs, etc.
You are instructed that the phrase "trespassory voyeurism"
means entering onto someone's property unlawfully to derive sexual
pleasure in looking at sex acts, genital organs, etc.

^

A"
Webster's

Encyclopedic

Dictionary

1052,

1104

(1990)

c:snyji5.rtd

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
INSTRUCTION NO
You are instructed that the word "expose" is defined as "to
deprive of shelter, protection, or care . . . to lay open to view,

to lay bare."
You are further instructed that the phrase "exposes his or her
genitals or private parts"

••—^—B-=H*~9-HF0£-T-5- is limited to

instances involving at least partial nudity.
YooTliTirT^
conduct whic.

'—""^-^Hfects

public attention to one'~ ^<^-tSTs o r p r i v at^"^»Pts,,^s^ot

an

exposur<*^MrVoXKt\\& meaning of this law

c:8nyji2-rt(1

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _ ^ _ _
You are instructed that the word "affront" means "to insult,
especially to the face by behavior or language."
You are instructed that the word "alarm means "a sudden sharp
apprehension and fear resulting from the perception of imminent
danger."

Webster's

Ninth

New Collegiate

Dictionary

62;

68

(1983).

c:snyji7.rtd

